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BOOK REVIEWS
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY. By Julius G.
Getman,* Stephen B. Goldberg,** and Jeanne B. Herman.*** New
York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1976. Pp. xvii, 218. $7.50.
Reviewed by Donald L. Martint
It is truly rare when independent scholarship in the social sci-
ences has a dramatic and rapid effect on the formation of public
policy. Yet it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the recent deci-
sion by the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to reverse its
paternalistic policies towards employees involved in union represen-
tation elections was strongly influenced by the empirical efforts of
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman.
Between 1962 and the spring of 1977 the Board followed a policy
of protecting employees from campaign rhetoric, including both
promises of benefits and threats of reprisals, that might prevent
employees from forming an uninhibited opinion in deciding for or
against union representation. The Board sought to maintain
"laboratory conditions"' in order to conduct experiments in in-
dustrial democracy. In the interest of maintaining election condi-
tions "as nearly ideal as possible,"' the Board assumed the power
to issue cease and desist orders concerning unacceptable pre-
election campaign activities, to set aside elections, and even to order
an offending employer to recognize a union that had lost its repre-
sentation election. This power derives from the Board's assumed
ability to determine which campaigning tactics are likely to inter-
fere with employee freedom of choice.
It is particularly remarkable that the Board has never at-
tempted to examine empirically whether any of the forbidden cam-
paign conduct had a significant effect on the outcome of representa-
tion elections. In fact, the Board had refused even to consider empir-
ical evidence whenever attempts were made to introduce it. Instead,
it was content to operate on a priori conclusions based on a set of
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untested explicit and implicit assumptions. That is, the Board con-
cerned itself only with whether it was reasonable to conclude that
the conduct in question tended to prevent the free formation of
political choice by employees. The authors correctly see this as un-
sound methodology in that the questions with which the Board deals
cannot be answered from reasoned assumptions alone. They are
empirical questions, and in UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW
AND REALITY the authors take on the task of formulating and testing
them against the evidence.
The book contains seven chapters and six appendices organized
around surveys of employee attitudes, knowledge, and perceptions
about the prospect of unionization at their respective places of em-
ployment, and how, if at all, these were affected by employer and
union campaign activities.
Two surveys or interviews of employees were conducted in each
of the thirty-one representation elections sampled by the authors.
The first, or wave I, was conducted after a representation election
had been directed by the Board but before an election campaign had
begun. The purpose of wave I was to record the predisposition of
employees toward union representation. The second survey, or wave
II, of the same employees was conducted immediately after an elec-
tion in order to record employee impressions of campaign content,
as well as how and why they voted as they did. The data from wave
H were then matched against the authors' election "predictions"
derived from employee pre-election predispositions to unionization.
Particular care was taken to select a sample of elections that prom-
ised to contain unlawful campaign activities of the kind that the
Board had previously found sufficient to set aside an election or to
direct that an employer recognize, as the exclusive bargaining
agent, a union that had actually lost the representation election. If
the outcome of the vote in the employee sample could be predicted
from voting intentions as recorded in wave I, the Board's assump-
tions about the effect of campaign content, especially of unlawful
conduct, on the voting behavior of employees would be highly sus-
pect, and its decisions disallowing election outcomes on the ground
that they resulted from biases in the campaign would be unjustified.
The authors found that employee voting is significantly corre-
lated with measures of predisposition towards unionization for 81%
of the voters interviewed. This means that 19% of those interviewed
did not vote in accordance with their revealed intentions as sur-
veyed prior to the election. This group is certainly large enough to
have an effect on the outcome of an election, and in nine of thirty-
one elections these "switchers" were decisive. Were they influenced
by the campaign, and, if so, were they influenced by unlawful cam-
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paign tactics? Given its commitment to "ideal election conditions,"3
an affirmative answer might justify the Board's control over cam-
paign speech and actions even though it could expect that only a
minority of employees would be influenced by campaign content.
The difficulty lies in determining whether "switchers" were
truly influenced by campaign content. The authors employ a test
that is not altogether satisfying. They assume that a voter's ability
to recall campaign issues after an election is an index of his familiar-
ity with the issues covered. The authors contend that voters who
switched from their intended choice because of campaign content
were perhaps more familiar with the issues at stake than voters who
did not switch, since based on the foregoing assumption, the latter
registered very little familiarity with the substance of the campaign.
More particularly, the authors determined that those voters who
revealed in pre-campaign interviews an intent to choose the com-
pany, but who switched instead and voted for the union, registered
relatively greater familiarity with campaign issues than did voters
whose intent to choose the company was not altered. On the other
hand, the authors found that those voters who switched to the com-
pany side were no more familiar with campaign issues than those
who pursued their original intent to vote union. Since a relatively
larger number of switchers voted for the company, this may suggest
that the recall index of campaign familiarity which was employed
by the authors may not be a reliable indicator of campaign familiar-
ity. This unhappy interpretation, however, is ignored by the au-
thors. They argue instead that switchers to the company were im-
pressed not by specific campaign content, but rather by the fact
that employers made some campaign effort. The authors apparently
believe that merely reminding employees that the company has
good working conditions and competitive salaries is sufficient to
retrieve the sentiments of workers who intend to vote for a change,
that is, to vote for the union. They conclude that switching to the
union is caused by campaign content but switching to the company
is not. This asymmetry in criteria to predict switching is less than
convincing. It is certainly no more persuasive than the alternative
interpretation that one's ability to recall campaign issues after the
election is no measure of the impact which the discussion of those
issues may have had on employees at the time of voting.
Switching may be caused by a fear of reprisals. Employees
intending to vote union may be "persuaded" to switch in the face
of reprisals by a firm that may lay off more workers, close down
3. Id. at 4.
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entirely, provoke more strikes, or otherwise harass union sympathiz-
ers. The authors, however, could find no significant difference be-
tween switchers and nonswitchers in their perception of unlawful
campaign tactics that might cause the former to behave differently
from the latter. This result is a disturbing feature of their analysis.
The distinct impression is made that employee voting behavior,
including the voting behavior of switchers, is not influenced to any
significant degree by the campaign issues and content presented by
companies and unions. Why then would these adversaries devote
resources to persuasion, misrepresentation, threats, and reprisals?
This question is not explicitly addressed by the authors, and it
should have been. The union may mount several costly campaigns.
Firms may face several costly representation elections. If little influ-
ence is to be gained by campaigning, why do it? It would be cheaper
to hold elections without campaigning. It is more likely that the
authors have not been able to measure effectively the effects of
campaign content on switching.
The only Board assumption that was left standing after an
intensive empirical examination by the authors was that which pos-
tulates a relationship between the demand to be represented by a
union, as evidenced by signed employee authorization cards, and
the voting behavior of card signers. The authors report that 72% of
card signers voted for union representation. This is a relatively im-
portant finding since many critics believe that card signing may
occur under duress and may not be an indication of employee desire
for union representation.
The authors recommend, on the basis of what they believe to
be impressive evidence, that several changes be made in Board
policy with respect to representation elections. Since voting behav-
ior in elections where the Board believes there have been unlawful
campaign tactics is not significantly different from voting behavior
under "laboratory conditions" as defined by the Board, the authors
see no reason for the continued regulation of campaign content, the
setting aside of elections, or bargaining orders directing a firm to
recognize a union despite the election outcome. Much of what the
Board has recently changed in its rules for conducting representa-
tion elections is consistent with the conclusions of this book.
In this review I have studiously avoided trifling attacks on tech-
nical statistical issues. Yet it is impossible to ignore what must be
judged sloppy and misleading statistical exposition. Throughout the
book, the authors are concerned with the relationship between vot-
ing predispositions, campaign familiarity, voter perception of un-
lawful campaign tactics, and actual voting behavior. To test these
relationships, individual and multiple correlations were run be-
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tween actual voting behavior and these variables. The results of
these tests were then reported and certain conclusions were estab-
lished. For example, in chapter three the results of a multiple linear
regression revealed a significant relationship between employee pre-
campaign attitudes toward job and union, and employee choice in
representation elections. However, from Table 3-4,4 it is difficult to
determine whether this significant relationship has causal implica-
tions. The authors report an adjusted multiple correlation
coefficient of .67. Does this mean that 67% of the observed variation
in voting behavior can be explained or predicted by differences in
employee attitudes toward job and union, or does it mean that the
three variables are correlated, but not necessarily in a causal way,
67% of the time?
The important distinction between a multiple coefficient of
determination, conventionally symbolized by r2 (or what the authors
refer to as the "power of the correlation" ' ) and the multiple correla-
tion coefficient itself, the square root of that "power" statistic, is left
unclear throughout the entire text. As a consequence the reader is
never sure if the authors' claim that voting predisposition variables
have "high predictive power" is correct or not. In reference to the
contents of Table 3-4, the authors write: "[Tihe regression equa-
tion may be used to predict how each individual employee will
vote."' In the next paragraph they state: "Overall we could correctly
predict 81% of the employees' votes from their pre-campaign atti-
tudes."7 But when reference is made to Table 3-4 this 81% figure is
not apparent. Nor is it derived from any explicit calculation. How
can one not be confused by such exposition?
As it happens, 81% is approximately the square root of 67%, the
adjusted multiple correlation coefficient found in Table 3-4. If this
is a correct interpretation, it means that 81% is a measure of
correlation not prediction (.67 is a measure of prediction or the
power of correlation, i.e., r2). The confusion between r and r2 as
measures of prediction permeates the entire manuscript. The au-
thors state: "Intent was the single best predictor of vote."8 They
then cite a correlation coefficient of r = .73. The predictor statistic
is the square of this correlation statistic. Thus, through "intent,"
they were able to explain less than 50% of the variation in vote, not
73%. The latter statistic simply means that intent and actual vote
4. Id. at 61.
5. Id. at 55 n. 5.
6. Id. at 61.
7. Id. at 62.
8. Id. at 64.
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moved in the same direction 73% of the time, or that 73% of the
employees interviewed voted as they intended. To see the difference
between prediction and correlation one need only imagine two varia-
bles that are highly correlated with a third variable that is not
stated explicitly. As this third variable moves, the other two varia-
bles might move with it. Thus, they are correlated. This third varia-
ble may be causally related to the first two. If the third variable were
held constant, variations in one of the explicitly stated variables
may have no effect on the other explicitly stated variable, so that
one may not predict movements in one from changes in the other.
Thus, correlation and prediction statistics give very different infor-
mation, and it is extremely dangerous to confuse them in presenta-
tion.
Moreover, the authors fail to inform us of the statistical signifi-
cance of the coefficients associated with the independent variables
employed in their multiple regression. Consequently, we have no
way of knowing if attitudes toward jobs or unions are independent
sources of voting outcomes. This is a very serious omission.
The failure of the authors to keep these distinctions straight has
severely damaged an otherwise commendable effort to bring some
evidence to bear on important policy questions. Nevertheless, for
the student of labor relations and labor law, it is a book worth
reading, if only as a demonstration that esoteric policy questions in
law and industrial relations are amenable to empirical analysis as
conducted in the social sciences.
TAX DESK BOOK FOR THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION. By Albert M.
Lehrman, Professor of Law, Texas Southern University, Houston,
Texas. Institute for Business Planning, Englewood Cliffs, New Jer-
sey. 1978. Pp. xviii, 408. $29.95.
Reviewed by Hugh L. Sowards*
Even the most casual observer cannot fail to notice the stagger-
ing complexity of current tax law. The exhaustive number of deci-
sions and IRS rulings and the ever-changing statutes, rules and
regulations serve only as a starting point in the search for a satisfac-
tory solution. Applicability and interpretation may present equally
formidable and time-consuming obstacles, especially in the fast-
moving area of corporate tax law. Frequently, too, the explanatory
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